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I. INTRODUCTION
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is "hopelessly divided" ovei'an
appropriate standard for patent subject matter eligibility, creating a current state
of crisis.' Patents, which serve "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts," 2 aid 40 million jobs and contribute $5 trillion to the gross national
product.3 Patent subject matter eligibility is governed by 35 U.S.C." 5-101,
which, creates four statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter "any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,or any new and
However, courts have developed three
useful improvement thereof. ' 4
exceptions to the statutory categories: "[1]aws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas."'5 With the growth of technology in the last several decades,
thousands of patents now cover various aspects of the Intemet, 6 andscholars
estimate that 40,000 software patents are granted each year. 7 It is the patent
eligibility of these computer-related method or software inventions, which. often
fall under the exception for abstract ideas, that have especially contributed to
the disastrous upheaval surrounding patent law in the Federal Circuit.
Consequently, many commentators believe the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO), which processes hundreds of thousands of patent
applications each year,8 is also perplexed regarding how to properly evaluate
these patent claims and is conducting inconsistent examinations. 9 Patentees

I Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, No. 13-255
(U.S. Aug. 23, 2013), 2013 WL 4495981, at *4 [hereinafter WildTangent's Petition for Certiorari].
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3 The P'ship for Pub. Serv., Bringng Innovations to the Markp/ace Through a Streamlined PatentReview
System, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federaLgovemmen
t/bringing-innovations-to-the-marketplace-through-a-streamlired-patent-review-system/2013/09/1
6/8ca5a814-1fl2-11e3-b7dl-7153ad47b549_story.html.
4 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
5 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
6 See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of FuncionalClaiming, 2013 Wis. L. REv.
905, 929-30 (discussing the problems related to software patents, including the "hundreds or
thousands" of patents likely covering "open-source technologies").
7 Debra Brubaker Burns, Titans and Trolls Enterthe Open-Source Arena, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH.
L.J. 33, 56 (2013).
8 In 2012, the United States Patent and Trademark Office processed a total of 576,763
applications. PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S.
PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR YEARS 1963-2013 (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
ac/ido/oeip/taf/data/us-stat.pdf.
9 Karen G. Potter & Kate Rigout, Results of AIPL Biotechnologv Committee Sunny Regardng the U.S.
Spreme Coun Deision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, AIPLA (2014),
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fear the possibility of validity attacks on their patents, but are uncertain how to
draft future patent claims that will withstand attack. Not only is the state of
ambiguity making "investments riskier and stif[ling] innovation' in the
technology sector," but it is also burdening the courts with high administration
costs. 10
Litigation concerning patent infringement is growing, and "software patents
account for 89% of this increase."" According to one scholar, this is because
"[s]oftware is a technology that represents broad classes of interactions
abstractly. That makes it inherently difficult to tie down a software patent to a
specific inventive concept."' 12 Similarly, another scholar attributes this inherent
difficulty to the "intrinsic nature of software: ....[S]oftware inventions are
pure functionality ....[They] cannot be defined with references to the physical,
structural properties of either a tangible copy of the software on. a -storage
medium or a computer programmed with the software. They can only be
defined, by their behavior or function."'13 This in turn leads to "patent law's
funelionality mafffunction: the invention-structure equation."' 14 The inventionstructure equation focuses on the structure of the claimed invention to rule out
overbroad claims; 15 however, it "is ineffective whenever it is brought to bear on
inventions, such as software, that are pure functionality."' 16 To complicate the
matter, the software industry is a fast-growing component of our nation's
economy, 17 rendering it especially critical for a clear and effective standard to
determine patent eligibility. Moreover, opportunistic patent trolls 18 are thriving

http://www.aipla.org/comnittees/cormmittee-pages/Biotechnology/diagnostics/shared%20Docume
nts/DiagnosticsBuzz_201401.pdf
10WildTangent's Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1, at 31-32.
11 James Bessen, The Patent Troll Crisis is Real# a Software Patent Crisis, WASH. POST (Sept. 3,
2013, 1:46 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/03/the-paten
t-troll-crisis-is-really-a-software-patent-crisis/.
12 Id.
13 Kevin Emmerson Collins, Patent Law's Functionak# Mafunction and the Problem of Overbroad,
FunctionalSoftware Patents, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. 1399, 1402 (2013).
14 Id.at 1403.
15 "Software patents are overbroad... [because] they routinely grant investors rights that
extend further beyond the technology that an inventor has actually invented and disclosed." Id.at
1400.
16 Id
17 Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Fad'tateFinancingin the Software Industry?, 83 TEx. L. REv. 961,
963 (2005).
18 For a definition of patent trolls, see Burns, supra note 7, at 65 ("Patent-assertion
entities [(PAEs)] ...are often led by patent attorneys who see opportunities to acquire patents
and then sue businesses that are allegedly infringing those patents. PAEs, like modem-day
mythical trolls hiding under IP bridges, buy IP created by others and then opportunistically
extract licensing fees as a form of bridge troll.").
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on the abundance of overbroad software claims, increasing transaction costs
and causing frivolous patent litigation. 19
Bilksi v. Kappos, 20 the first Supreme Court case addressing 35 U.S.C. 101 in
over a decade, sparked the recent controversy in the courts regarding the patent
eligibility of processes. 21 Prior to Biski, the courts routinely applied the
"machine-or-transformation test" (MOT), which defines a claimed process as
"patent-eligible under 5 101: [if] (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus,
' 22
The
or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.
Federal Circuit addressed the issue in 2008, and concluded that the MOT test was
23
the "governing test for determining [the] patent-eligibility of [process claims].
However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2010 and rejected the Federal
Circuit's approach, 24 declaring instead that the MOT test is merely a "useful and
important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed
inventions are processes under 5 101."25 But to the dismay of the patent
community, the Court failed to provide any alternatives to the test.26 Of similar
significance, the Court repudiated the Federal Circuit's categorical exclusion of
business methods claims,27 clarifying that there may be "at least some processes
that can be fairly described as business methods that are within patentable subject
matter under 5 101,"28 Nevertheless, allowing Bilski, the MOT test has persisted
29
in the district courts.
In its most recent opinion on the topic of patent eligibility, the Supreme
Court addressed the patent eligibility of a process for determining the optimal
drug dosage for treating autoimmune diseases in Mayo Collaboraive Services v.
19 See general# Bessen, supra note 11 (describing the general costs and causes of patent trolls); see
also Burns, supra note 7, at 65 ("Patent lawsuits involving PAEs have increased dramatically over
the last decade with the number of PAE-instigated patent lawsuits in the United States increasing
by an estimated average of more than thirty-three percent peryearsince 2004. Software patents
may account for over ninety percent of troll's [sic] most-litigated patents.").
20 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
21 Mark A. Lemley et al., LifeAfierBilski, 63 STAN. L. REv. 1315, 1318 (2011).
-2 Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Id. at 956.
24 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 ("The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for
deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible 'process.'").
25 Id.
26 See id. at 3231 (declining to offer guidance "beyond pointing to the definition of [process]
provided in § 100[b] and look to the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Dieb?' and inviting the
Federal Circuit to offer "other limiting criteria").
27 Id. at 3228.
28 Id. at 3229.
29 See, e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, No. CV 09-06918 RGK (PLAx), 2010 WL
3360098, at *2-5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010), rev'd sub noma.Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722
F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
23
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PrometheusLaboratories,Inc.30 Although the Court categorized the process under
the laws of nature rather than the abstractness exception, 31 its analytical
framework is also applicable to software claims. Specifically, the Court declared
that "one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the
words 'apply it,' " and insisted that "the use of a natural law also contain other
elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an 'inventive
concept.'"32 Unfortunately, the meaning of "inventive concept" generated
confusion and an abundance of commentary, with many scholars predicting
33
that the decision "would radically change the landscape of patent law."
Most recently, in May of 2013, the Federal Circuit issued a highly anticipated
en banc rehearing of CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Cotp. py,34 which many people
expected to provide clarity on the appropriate standard for eligibility of process
and methods claims under § 101.35 The Federal Circuit disappointed all by
issuing a total of five separate opinions, with additional reflections by Judge
Rader, demonstrating the law's colossal uncertainty and perpetuating the state
of mayhem for anxious patent claimants. 36 Judge Lourie delineated a "strong
view" of the eligibility requirement that would have found all of Alice's claims
38
ineligible, 37 referred to as an "Integrated Approach" by some lower courts.
Chief Judge Rader presented a "weak view," 39 which lower courts have'referred
to as the "Meaningful Limitations Approach." 4 Judge Newman favored an
"even weaker view," such that all the claims would have been eligible under
101.41 Chief Judge Rader's concurring opinion provides a summary of the
discord that currently exists between the Federal Circuit judges:

30132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
31 Id.at 1294.
Id.
33 See Jessica Belle, Prometheus v. Mayo: Limited Implcadionsfor f 101 Juriprudence,8 WASH. J.L.
TECH & ARTS 555, 563-64 (2013) ("The patent law community was generally shocked by the
Court's decision in Prometheus and numerous law review articles have been written on the decision
injust over a year.').
34 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir.), cert.granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013).
35 See, e.g., Bernard Chao, Findingthe Point of Novelv in Software Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1217, 1249 ("IMhe judges were badly divided and the decision failed to give the guidance that so
many followers of the court sought.").
36 CLS Bank, 717 F.3d 1269.
37 Bernard Chao, InterpretingCLS Bank Int'l. v. Alice, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.
patentlyo.com/patent/2013/09/interpreting-cls-bank-ind-v-alice.html.
38 E.g., Zillow Inc. v. Trulia, Inc., No. C12-1549 JLR, 2013 WL 4782287, *5 (W.D. Wash. Sept.
6, 2013); Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-219, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116898,
2013 WL 4427811, at *3 (W.D. Mich. 2013, Aug. 19, 2013).
32

39 Chao, supra note 37.

4o See Zillow, 2013 WL 4782287, at *5;PlanetBingo, 2013 WL 4427811, at *3.
41 Chao, supra note 37.
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[n]o
portion
of
any
opinion
issued... garners
a
majority.... Although a majority of the judges on the court agree
that the method claims do not recite patent eligible subject
matter, no majority of those judges agrees as to the legal rationale
for that conclusion. Accordingly,. . . nothing said today beyond
our judgment has the weight of precedent. 42
In a subsequent opinion, Chief Judge Rader further remarked that "prior to
granting en banc review in CLS Bank, this court commented: 'no one
understands what makes an idea abstract.' After CS Bank, nothing has
43
changed."
Since CLU Bank, the Federal Circuit has decided several other software
patent eligibility cases under § 101 to no avail: The division between the judges
persists, leaving patentees, the USPTO, and lower courts hopelessly searching
for clarity on the proper eligibility standard. Their search may be nearing a
conclusion, on December 6, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for
CU1 Bank,44 presenting the perfect opportunity for the Court to clarify the
appropriate subject matter eligibility standard for software and computer-related
inventions. In setting this standard, this Note argues that the Supreme Court
should formally adopt Judge Lourie's Integrated Approach for three reasons.
First, it is the approach most consistent with the Court's precedent in Mayo.
Second, it dictates results consistent with the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence in
prior software patent cases, providing an easily adoptable resolution to the
perceived ambiguity. Finally, its "strong view" 4 5 -embodying a substantive
vision of the invenfion-best promotes the underlying goals of patent law by
excluding overbroad claims that would otherwise work to (1) suppress future
innovation and competition, and (2) exacerbate the patent troll problem.
Part II of this Note discusses the relevant modem cases that provide
necessary background to the recent controversy surrounding patent subject
matter eligibility standards in the Federal Circuit. Throughout this discussion,
Part II elaborates on the statutory interpretation of § 101 and the varying views
regarding the proper patent eligibility standard. Part III analyzes the Federal
Circuit judges' proposed standards, as expressed in CLS Bank, and then
suggests that the Court should adopt Judge Lourie's Integrated Approach
because it is most consistent with its opinion in Mayo. Part III continues by
analyzing five additional software patent cases decided by the Federal Circuit in
CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1292 n.1 (Rader, C.J., concurring and dissenting in part).
Accenture Global Servs. v. Guideware Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(Rader, C.J., dissenting).
44 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013).
45 Chao, supra note 37.
42
43
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recent years. This analysis will demonstrate that Judge Lourie's approach
generates outcomes consistent with those cases, thus exemplifying that uniform
reasoning is readily available to resolve the perceived ambiguity and confusion.
Next, Part III also discusses how the Integrated Approach best effectuates the
purposes underlying patent law by both excluding overbroad claims that hurt
innovation and mitigating the patent troll problem. Finally, Part IV concludes
by summarizing why the Supreme Court should adopt the Integrated Approach
to settle the cloud of confusion hovering over patent subject matter eligibility
standards.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER AND COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS

As previously stated, patent eligible subject matter is statutorily limited to
"any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof."46 These four categories-pmcess,
method, manufacture, and composition of matter-can be split into two general
categories: product claims and method claims. 47 Product claims cover tangible
48
items and include "machine[s], manufacture[s], or composition[s] of matter.
Patents tied to machines are also generally referred to as system or apparatus
claims. 49 Method, or process claims, are defined as "process[es], art[s] or
method[s], and include[s] new use[s] of... known process[es], machine[s],
manufacture[s], composition[s] of matter, or material[s]."0 Generally, method
claims "recite a series of steps that lead to a useful result," and include
51
"intangible" items as opposed to "tangible matter.
The Supreme Court has identified three exceptions to the statutory
categories of patentable subject matter: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas." 52 These exceptions embody the "basic tools of scientific
and technological work,"5 3 and therefore must remain in the public domain to

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013) (No. 13-298)
[hereinafter Alice's Petition for Certiorari].
48 Id. at 6 (quoting 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CH1SUM ON PATENTS § 1.02 (2013)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
49 Id.
50 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006).
51 Alice's Petition for Certiorari, supra note 47, at 6.
52 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (quoting
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
53 Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46
47
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ensure that patent rights neither " 'tie up' the use of such tools [nor] 'inhibit
future innovation premised upon them.' ,4 In Myriad Genelics, the Supreme
Court explained, " 'all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon,
or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,' and 'too broad
an interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law.' "55
The Court recognizes, however, that it must find a "delicate balance between
cheating 'incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery "and"
impeding the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention.' "56
The exception for abstract ideas, often applicable to method claims,
underlies the cause of debate surrounding eligibility standards, specifically in the
realm of software inventions.57 In order for a process to be patentable, it must
have "additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature [or
These additional features must encompass an
abstract idea] itself."5 8
" 'inventive concept' and amount to more than merely steps involv[ing] wellunderstood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers
in the field." 5 9 Currently, the Federal Circuit is "hopelessly divided" on an
appropriate test to determine the subject matter eligibility for computer-related
patents under § 101.60
It should be noted that the eligibility standard under § 101 is separate from
the substantive patentability requirements of novelty (§ 102), non-obviousness
(§ 103), and formalities (5 112).61 As the Federal Circuit points out, "title 35
54 Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301).
55 Id. (quotingMayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293).
56 Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305).
57 See, e.g., Bilkski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Accenture Global Servs. v. Guidewire
Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir., cert.filed, No. 13-918 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 31, 2014)), 2014 WL
356573; Ultramercial, LLC, v. Hulu, Inc., 722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013), pefilion for cert.filed, 82
U.S.L.W. 310 (U.S. Aug. 23, 2013) (No. 13-255), 2013 WL 4495981; CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice
Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013); CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011); SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological
Labs., SA, 852 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D.D.C. 2012).
58 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297.
59 Id. at 1294.

60 WildTangent's Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1, at 4; see also CIS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1321
(Newman, J., dissenting)) ("[W]e have propounded at least three incompatible standards, devoid
of consensus, serving simply to add to the unreliability and cost of the system of patents as an
incentive for innovation."); Jason Rantanen, Surprise! The Law of Subject Matter Elgibilty Remains
Unsettled,PATENTLY-O (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.patendyo.com/patent/2013/09/surprise-thelaw-of-subject-matter-eigibility-remains-unsettled.html ("It is difficult to think of an issue that
has more deeply divided the Federal Circuit over the past few years than subject matter
eligibility.").
61 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (rejecting the Government's argument for conflating § 101 with
§§ 102, 103, and 112); seegeneraly 35 U.S.C. % 102, 103, 112 (2006).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol21/iss2/5

8

Moss: The Integrated Approach: A Solution to Patent Subject Matter Elig

2014]

THE INTEGRATED APPROACH

does not list a single ineligible category, suggesting that any new, non-obvious,
and fully disclosed technical advance is eligible for protection, subject to
the.. limited judicially created exceptions." 62 In other words, § 101 sets forth
categories of items that are eligible for patent protection, and the other
patentability sections exclude claims that fail to meet the respective
requirements.
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that these other
patentability requirements should not factor into a patent-eligibility test under
5 101.63
B. FOUNDATIONAL PRECEDENT FOR § 101'S APPLICATION TO COMPUTERRELATED INVENTIONS

The Supreme Court's precedential opinions have also established a
foundation of useful guidance regarding the patent eligibility of software and
computer-related inventions. First, Gol/schalk v. Benson considered a process
claim for a computer-implemented method to convert binary-coded decimal
(BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals. 64 The Court predicted the practical
effect that would result from granting a patent on the method and concluded
that the claims lacked any substantial practical application, besides a connection
with a digital computer, to prevent the patent from pre-empting the algorithm
itself.65 In holding the claim ineligible under 5 101, Justice Douglas noted that
the claim was "so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown
uses of the [conversion process]," 66 suggesting that courts should consider a
patent's likely impact on technology and seek to foster future innovation.

62

Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu,LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded

sub noma.
WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012); see also
CLS Bank, 717
F.3d 1269, 1297 (Roger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A]ny analysis of subject
matter eligibility for patenting must begin by acknowledging that any new and useful process,
machine, composition or matter, or manufacture, or an improvement thereof, is eligible for
patent protection. While a claim may not later meet the rigorous conditions for patentability,
section 101 makes these broad categories of claimed subject matter eligible for that
consideration.").
63 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304; see
also
SmartGene Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 852 F.
Supp. 2d 42, 51-52 ("[In Mayo,] the Supreme Court... clarified that a 35 U.S.C. § 101 subject
matter patentability inquiry is the threshold analysis for determining patent validity. The Supreme
Court explicitly rejected that the 'screening function' of 35 U.S.C. 5 101 may be performed by
determining the novelty, non-obviousness, or the adequacy of the written specification of a
patentable claim. The Court cautioned that '[shifting] the patent-eligibility inquiry entirely to
these later sections risks creating significantly greater legal uncertainty, while assuming that those
sections can do work that they are not equipped to do.' " (second alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303-04)).
64 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
65 Id. at 71-72.
66 Id. at 68.
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The Supreme Court took a similar position in Parkerv. Flook, which involved
a method for calculating alarm system values by utilizing a mathematical
formula and well-known catalytic conversion processes. 67 The Court reasoned
that the application "simply provid[ed] a new and presumably better method for
calculating alarm limit values," 68 and concluded that the mathematical formula
itself was not transformed into eligible subject matter simply because ithe
formula was tied to "post-solution activity. '69 Justice Stevens further explained
that the process fell under the abstract idea exception because there was no
70
"inventive concept" tied to the application of the mathematical formula.
In contrast, the Court held the process in Diamond v. Diehr for molding raw,
uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products using a mathematical
formula and programmed digital computer eligible under § 101.71 Justice
Rehnquist distinguished this process from those in Benson and Flook and found
that the application of the formula here undisputedly "involve[d] the
transformation of an article.., into a different state or thing," 72 and that the
patentees "'.[sought] only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in
conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process." 73 The Court
was careful to clarify that a claim "does not become nonstatutory simply
because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital
computer," and that "an applicalion of a law of nature or mathematical formula
74
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection."
Additionally, the Court emphasized that "claims must be considered as a
whole. 7 5 The Court declared:
It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements
and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the
analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because a new
combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though
all the constituents of the combination were well known and in
common use before the combination was made. The "novelty"
of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself,
is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a

67 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
68 Id. at 595-96.
69 Id

at 590.

70 Id. at 594.
71 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
72 Id. at 184.
73 Id. at 187.
74 Id.

75 Id. at 188.
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claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable
76
subject matter.
The preceding passage is commonly quoted in subsequent cases and has
become integral to the analysis of subject matter eligibility, even inciting
contention between some of the Judges in CLS Bank.77 Overall, Benson, Flook,
and Diehr constitute the "trilogy of useful guideposts," as recently affirmed by
the Supreme Court in both Bilski and Mayo, for "considering exceptions to
''78
patent subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Finally, Bilski v. Kappos involved claims to processes reciting a hedging
strategy for consumers to balance risk.79 The Court, comparing the case to
Benson, Flook, and Diehr, argued that the claims "add[ed] even less to the
underlying abstract principle than the invention in Flook," and therefore
concluded that the strategy was simply a patent-ineligible mathematical
formula.80 Focusing on the importance of technological advancement, the
Court refused to extend a patent monopoly over an abstract idea' that would
preempt it from use in other fields. 81
The Bilski Court also considered two categorical limitations on patenteligible processes: the machine-or-transformation (MOT) test and business
methods patents. Under the MOT test, a process is patent eligible "only if: '(1)
it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular
article into a different state or thing.' "82 Justice Kennedy clarified that
"adopting the [MOT] test as the sole test for what constitutes a 'process' (as
opposed to just an important and useful clue) violates [the] statutory
interpretation principles," 83 and rather it is just an "investigative tool." 84 While
he recognized "that patents for inventions that did not satisfy [MOT] were
rarely granted in early eras," Justice Kennedy explained that "[t]echnology and

76 Id. at 188-89.

77 See 717 F.3d 1269, 1314 (Moore, J., and Rader, C.J., dissenting in part) ("My colleagues
erroneously apply Prometheus' 'inventive concept' language by stripping away all known elements
from the asserted system claims and analyzing only whether what remains as opposed to the claim as a
whole, is an abstract idea. See Laurie Op. at 1290-91." (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Ultramerial,
722 F.3d 1335, 1344;Accenture, 800 F. Supp. 2d 613, 619.
78 SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 852 F. Supp. 2d 42, 52 (D.D.C. 2012)
(citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298-1301; Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010)).
79 130 S. Ct. 3218.
80 Id.at 3231.
81 Id.

82 Id. at 3225 (quoting In reBilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
83 Id. at 3226.
84 Id. at 3227.
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other innovations progress in unexpected ways."8 5 Accordingly, "[§] 101 is a
'dynamic provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions,' "86
87
which "may call for new inquiries."
For similar reasons, the Court elucidated the inappropriateness of
categorically excluding business methods patents.8 8 Process under § 101 may
include, at least in some circumstances, business methods (defined vaguely as "a
method of doing or conducting business"). 89 However the Court explicitly
noted that even if a business method fits into the definition of process under the
statute, to be patentable it must still meet the requirements of novelty (§ 102),
nonobviousness (5 103), and be fully and particularly described (§ 112). 90 These
limitations filter out patents not justified by the statutory requirements, thus
balancing the tension between "stimulating innovation" without "impeding
progress." 91
C. POST-B!LSK[ CONFUSION

After Bilski, courts and the USPTO continued to apply the MOT test.92
Although courts recognized that it was not the sole test for subject matter
eligibility, they relied on it as a "key indicator," as they knew of no alternative
93
standard to analyze method claims.
For example, in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Deisions, Inc., the Federal Circuit
applied the MOT test to affirm the invalidity of claims reciting "a 'method and
system for detecting fraud in a credit card transaction between [a] consumer
and a merchant over the Internet.'
In addition to failing the MOT test, the
claims were also held ineligible for reciting nothing more than a mental
process: 95 "[m]ethods which can be performed entirely in the human mind are
unpatentable... because... [they] embody the 'basic tools of scientific and
"94

85 Id.
86
87

88

Id (quotingJ.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Brad Int'l, Inc., 853 U.S. 124,135 (2001)).
Id. at 3228.

Id.

89 Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 273(A)(1) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
5(a), 125 Stat. 284, 297)(internal quotation marks omitted).
90 Id. at 3229.
91 Id.

Lemley et al., supra note 21, at 1315.
Id. at 1319 (quoting Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, No. CV 09-06918 RGK (PLAx), 2010
WL 3360098, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010), rev'd sub norm. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722
F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
94 654 F.3d 1366, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Method & Sys. for Detecting Fraud in a
Credit Card Transportation Over the Internet, U.S. Patent No. 6,029,154, at [57] (filed July 28,
1997)) (issued Feb. 22, 2000).
95 Id. at 1371.
92
93
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technological work' that are free to all men and reserved exclusively to none." 96
The court also concluded that CyberSource's Beauregard claim--"a claim to a
computer readable medium (e.g., a disk, hard drive, or other data storage
device) containing program instructions for a computer to perform a particular
process" 9 7 -should be treated the same way as the ineligible mental process
since "simply reciting the use of a computer to execute an algorithm that can be
performed entirely in the human mind" does not "demonstrate that [the claim]
is 'truly drawn to a specific' computer readable medium, rather than to the
underlying [mental process]." 98
D. THE SUPREME COURT'S GUIDANCE IN MAYO

In 2012 the Supreme Court granted certiorari for Mayo CollaborativeServices v.
Prometheus Laboratories,Inc.99 Although the case pertains to the "laws of nature"
exception, 100 its subject matter eligibility analysis is useful for assessing claims
that fall under the abstractness exception. 10 1 Here, the Court held ineligible
"patent claims covering processes that help doctors who use thiopurine drugs
to treat patients with autoimmune diseases determine whether a given dosage
level is too low or too high."' 1 2 After laying out the statutory categories and
judicial exceptions, 10 3 Justice Breyer posed the patent-eligibility question as
"whether the claims do significantly more than simply describe [the
unpatentable] natural... correlations between thiopurine metabolite levels and
the toxicity and efficacy of thiopurine drug dosages" -i.e., "do the patent
claims add enough to their statements of the correlations to allow the processes
10 4
they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that app!y natural laws?"'
In unanimously concluding that the claims failed to do so, the Court relied on
its precedent for three important principles: (1) precedent warns "against
interpreting patent statutes in ways that make patent eligibility 'depend simply
on the draftsman's art' without reference to the 'principles underlying the

96

Id. at 1373 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).

97 Id.
98 Id.at 1374-75.

99 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012).
100 Id.at 1296-1304.
101The opinion actually uses a variant of "abstract" no less than eleven times in its analysis. Id.
at 1293-94, 1297-98, 1300-02. See also Bernard Chao, Finding the Point of Novely in Software Patents,
28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1233-36 (describing Mayo's applicability to the abstractness
exception).

102 132 S. Ct. 1294
103 Id. at 1293.
104 Id. at 1296-97.

(2012).
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prohibition against patents for [natural laws],' "105(2) precedent warns "against
upholding patents that claim processes that too broadly preempt the use of a
natural law,"'106 and (3) precedent "insist[s] that a process that focuses upon the
use of a natural law also contain other. elements or a combination of elements,
sometimes referred to as a 'inventive concept,' sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural
law itself."'

107

Justice Breyer began his analysis with a statement summarizing these
principles: "[i]f a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is. a process
reciting a law of nature, unless that process has additional features that provide
practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the law of nature itself."' 10 8 "[A]ny additional steps consist[ing] of
well-understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the
scientific community" that "add nothing significant beyond the sum of their
parts taken separately ... . are not sufficient to transform [an] unpatentable [idea]
into [a] paeitable application[] of [the idea]."'10 9 In the case at hand, the Court
found the steps insufficient because "methods for determining metabolite levels
were well known in the art. Indeed, scientists routinely measured metabolites as
part of their investigations ... ."110 Quoting Bi/ski, Justice Breyer explained,
" 'the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas "cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment." .".
The Court reiterated that claims should be considered as a
whole and that the § 101 exceptions should be retained and not made "a dead
letter.""' Justice Breyer also alluded to the Court's concern for the recent
problems patents have created in the technological sector, arguing that the right
of "exclusivity [granted by patents] can impede the flow of information that
might permit, indeed spur, invention."11 3 Although Mayo arguably offered more
guidance to the Federal Circuit and other courts suffering from post-Bilski
confusion, the following opinions demonstrate fundamental discord persists
within the Federal Circuit.

105Id. at 1294 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)).
106 Id. (citing Gotschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972); O'Reiny v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 62, 114-15 (1853)).
107 Id. (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010); Flook, 47 U.S. at 594).
108 Id. at 1297.
109 Id. at 1298.

Id.
111Id. at 1297 (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 19192 (1981))).
112 Id. at 1303-04.
113 Id. at 1305.
110
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E. RECENT FEDERAL CIRCUIT SOFTWARE PATENT CASES

In Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, decided in January 2012, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the ineligibility of Dealertrack's. computer-aided method claims "for
processing credit applications over electronic networks "-i.e., "a clearinghouse
specifically to apply for car loans." 114 The court rationalized that the
"steps ... [did] not 'impose meaningful limits on the claim's scope' "115 because
they failed to "'specify how the computer hardware and database are
specifically programmed to perform the steps claimed in the patent.' "116
Although the court did not explicitly state it was applying the MOT test, it
pointed out the claims "do not require a specific application, nor are they tied
to a particular machine,"' 1 7 overall finding the "phrase 'computer aided ... no less
abstract than the idea of a clearinghouse itself."118
Another case, Bancorp Services, LLC. v. Sun Life Assurance Ca., involved
ineligible method, medium, and corresponding system claims for managing a
life insurance policy, each of which preempted an abstract idea." 9 Th, Federal
Circuit treated all the claims alike because "the specified machines appear to be
no more than object[s] on which the method operates"' 120 and "the form of the
claims should not trump basic issues of patentability.' 12' Turning to the
question of subject matter eligibility, the Federal Circuit noted that "[m]odern
computer technology offers immense capabilities" that may be patent eligible:
"[a] digital computer operates on data expressed in digits, solving a problem by
doing arithmetic as a person would do it by head and hand."'1 22 Hence, the
"interchangeability of [abstract] mental processes and basic digital
computation... help[s] explain why the use of a computer in an otherwise
patent-ineligible process for no more than its most basic function-making
calculations or computations-fails to circumvent the prohibition against
patenting abstract ideas and mental processes.' 1 23 The court continued, "to
salvage an otherwise patent-eligible process, a computer must be integral to the
claimed invention, facilitating the process in a way that a person making

114

674 F.3d 1315, 1317, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

115 Id. at 1333 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961-62 (Fed. Cit. 2008)).
116

Id. (quoting Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2009)).

117

Id.

118 Id. at 1333 (emphasis added).
119 687 F.3d 1266, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
120 Id. at 1276 (quoting Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1054,
1064 (E.D. Mo. 2011)).
121 Id. at 1277 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)).
122 Id. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"23 Id. at 1278.
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calculations or computations could not;124 more generally, for "a machine to
impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim... it must play a significant
part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function
solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more
quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for performing
calculations."' 1 25 Despite these declarations, the Federal Circuit still lacked a
dearly elucidated test for routine application.
Heeding the Supreme Court's advice in Mayo, the Federal Circuit next
granted an en banc rehearing of CLS Bank,126 an opinion many in the patent
community hoped would resolve the confusion over the correct § 101 eligibility
standard. 127 Unfortunately, the court issued a one paragraph per curiam opinion
by an equally divided court, merely affirming the ineligibility of method,
medium, and system claims for mitigating settlement risk. Four concurring and
dissenting opinions, and additional reflections by Judge Rader, followed.128 The
fragmented result demonstrates the Federal Circuit's division over a uniform
standard for analyzing method claims under § 101,129 and whether or not all
claims (whether characterized as method, medium, or system) should "rise and
fall together' ' l30 -i.e., whether all claims must be found either patent eligible or
ineligible because they contain only "minor differences in terminology" and
merely "require performance of the same basic process. '131 An overview of the
ten judges' views can be seen in Table 1, below:

Id.
Id. (quoting SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
126 CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cit. 2013) (en banc).
127 See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Federal Circuit Nightmare in CLS Bank v. Alice Corp., IPWATCHDOG
(May 10, 2013, 1:26 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/05/10/federal-circuit-nightmarein-cls-bank-v-alice-corp/id=40230/ ("[A]ll the important questions that we thought might be
answered remain completely and totally unanswered .....
128 CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1273 (per curium); id.
at 1273-92 (Lourie, J., concurring) (finding all
of the claims ineligible and joined by Circuit Judges Dyk, Prost, Reyna, and Wallach); id.
at 12921313 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding all of the systems claims
patent eligible and joined by Circuit Judges Linn, Moore, and O'Malley in Parts I-V and VII
while finding the method computer-related medium claims ineligible and joined by Circuit Judge
Moore in Parts VI and VIII); id.
at 1313-20 (Moore, J., dissenting in part).
129 WildTangent's Petition for Certiorari, supranote 1.
130 judge Lourie summarizes: "eight judges, a majority, have concluded that the particular
method, medium, and system claims at issue in this case should rise or fall together in the § 101
analysis." CIS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1274 n.1 (Lourie, J., concurring).
131 Id. at 1291.
124

125
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TABLE 1: CLS BANK III, 717 F.3D

JUDGE

LOURIE
REYNA
DYK
PROST
WALLACH
RADER
LINN
MOORE
O'MALLEY
NEWMAN

132
1269 (FED. CIR. 2013): RULINGS BYJUDGE

METHOD
CLAIMS PATENT
EHGmLE? (7-3)

CRM CLAIMs
PATENT
ELIGIBLE? (7-3)

SYSTEM CLAIMS
PATENT
ELIGIBLE? (5-5)

ALL CLAIMS
STAND OR FALL
TOGETHER? (8-2)

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

In their respective opinions, Judge Lourie, Chief Judge Rader, and Judge
Newman proposed starkly contrasting subject matter eligibility tests, each of

which will be separately outlined in the following paragraphs.
Judge Lourie's "Integrated Approach 133 presents a "strong view" 134 (finding
all of Alice's claims ineligible) that identifies a two-step process for determining
patent eligibility under § 101.135
First, one must ask "whether the claimed
invention fits within one of the four statutory classes set out in 5 101."136
Second, "[a]ssuming [the first] condition is met, the analysis turns to the judicial

exceptions to subject-matter eligibility." 137

In considering whether "the

abstractness exception applies, one must determine whether "the claim pose[s]
any risk of preempting an abstract idea.1 138 To do so, one should (a) "identify
and define whatever fundamental concept appears wrapped up in the claim,"
(Step 2(a)) and then (b) ask if there are any "additional substantive limitations
that narrow, confine, or otherwise tie down the claim so that, in practical terms,
132 Darrin A. Auito, Divided CAFC Finds Computer Sstem Claims Patent Ineligible, IPWATCHDOG
(Sept. 13, 2013, 1:23 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/09/13/divided-cafc-finds-compu
ter-system-claims-patent-ineigible/id=45195/. The judges highlighted in in light gray refer to the
judges selected for the panel in Acenture. See Accenture Global Servs. v. Guidewire Software,
Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1337 (Fed. Cit. 2013).
133 See Zillow, Inc. v. Trulia, Inc., No. C12-1549 JLR, 2013 WL 47822287, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Sept.
6, 2013) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice); Planet Bingo, LLC v.
VKGS, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-219, 2013 WL 4427811, at *3, *9-10 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013).
134 Chao, supra note 37.
135 CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1282 (Lourie,J., concurring).
136 Id.
137
138

Id.
Id.
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it does not cover the full abstract idea itself" (Step 2(b)). 139 Judge Lourie's
"substantive," limitation in Step 2(b) "has 'sometimes' been referred.to as an
'inventive concept,' "140 buthe emphasizes that inventiveness in the § 101 sense is
separate from the novely and nonobviousness requirements of patentability found
in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.141 Instead, "an 'inventive concept' in the 5 101
context refers to a genuine human contribution to the claimed subject
matter.' ' 42 Overall, steps 2(a) and 2(b) of Judge Lourie's "§ 101 preemption
143
analysis center [] on the practical, real-world effects of the claim."'
Accordingly, he emphasized that if the only limitations found in step 2(b)
"represent .-... human contribution[s] but are merely tangential, routine, wellunderstood, or conventional, or in practice fail to narrow the claim relative to
the fundamental principle [found in, Step 2(a)]," then those limitations "cannot
confer patent eligibility.' "'.
Chief Judge Rader's "Meaningful Limitations Approach"' 145 represents a
"weak'View"146 finding the method and medium claims ineligible, but the systems
claims eligible. This approach, also involving two steps, does not require that the
claims "ti'e and fall together." First, one identifies the abstract idea in the
claim.147 '"ISecond; one must ask "whether [the]" claim includes meaningful
148
limitations restricting it to an application, rather than merely an abstract idea."'
Chief Judge Rader emphasizes the Court's language in Mao that "one must do
more than simply state the law of nature while adding the words 'apply it' ";149
but, at the same time, "[one] cannot go hunting for abstractions by ignoring the
concrete, palpable, tangible limitations of the invention the patentee actually
139

Id.

140 Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294

(2012) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978))).
141 Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 102, 103 (2012)); see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303-04 ("[D]eclin[ing]
the Government's [argument] to substitute §§ 102 [and] 103... inquiries for the better
established inquiry under § 101.").
142 CIS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1283 ("[A] person cannot truly 'invent' an abstract idea or scientific
truth.... Accordingly, an 'inventive concept'.., must be 'a product of human ingenuity.'"
(quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980))).
143 Id.
144 Id.

See Zillow, Inc. v. Tralia, Inc., No. C12-1549 JLR, 2013 WL 4782227, at *5 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 6, 2013) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice) (quoting Planet
Bingo, LLC v. VKGS, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-219, 2013 WL 4427811, at *3) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
146 Chao, supra note 37.
147 See CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1297-98 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
145

("The concern ... is whether the claim seeks to patent an idea itself, rather than an application of
that idea.").
148 Id. at 129 (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297).
149 Id. at 1297 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294).
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claims."150 Chief Judge Rader interprets Mayo's inventive concept to mean
"whether implementing the abstract idea in the context of the claimed invention
inherently requires the recited steps."' 51
Others have characterized his
interpretation as meaning "that any system claim which contains, structural
limitations satisfies the inventive concept requirement."' 15 2 Concluding, Judge
Rader proclaims in his additional reflections, "[w]hen all else fails, consult the
53
statute!"1
Finally, Judge Newman asserts his own "even weaker view," which would
have found all of Alice's claims eligible. 5 4 Newman proposed using § 101 as a
"threshold into the patent system" and then examining "the particular subject
matter on the substantive criteria of patentability [(35 U.S.C. 5 102, 103, 112)]
to eliminate claims that are 'abstract' or 'preemptive.' "155 In other words, he
would eliminate the abstractness exception to § 101 and instead use §§ 102-103
address subject-matter eligibility 5 6 Judge Newman also argues that the form of
the claim should not factor into the § 101 analysis, to ensure that ,"[p]atent
eligibility does not turn on the ingenuity of the draftsman."' 57 Thus, he agrees
with the majority of the Federal Circuit judges that the claims shouldrise or fall
together1s 8 However, in Mayo, the Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed its
intention to retain the three judicial exceptions to 5 101, so Judge Newman's
approach should not be given much merit. 5 9 Moreover, since CLS Bank, Judge
Lourie's and Chief Judge Rader's approaches have been the only two applied by
the Federal Circuit; accordingly this Note will only consider their proposals (the
CLS Bank tests) for adoption by the Supreme Court.

150

Id.at 1298.

Id.at 1303.
152 Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS, LLC, 2013 WL 4427811, at *5, *13-14.
153 CIS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1335 (Rader, C.J., additional reflections).
154 Chao, supra note 37.
'55 CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1322 (Newman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156 See id.("[E]xamination of the particular subject matter on the substantive criteria of
patentability will eliminate claims that are 'abstract' or 'preemptive,' on application of the laws of
novelty, utility, prior art, obviousness, description, enablement, and specificity. There is no need
for an all-purpose definition of 'abstractness' or 'preemption,' as heroically attempted today.").
"'1

157 Id

158Id. ("The court should hold that the form of the claim does not determine section 101
eligibility.').
159Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 ("[The Court]
decline[s] the Government's invitation to substitute § 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the better
established inquiry under § 101.').
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F. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE CLS BANK TESTS

The CLS Bank tests were first re-applied in Ulramerial,Inc. v. Hulu,, LLC,
which involved a method for "distributing copyrighted products... over the
Internet where the consumer receives a copyrighted product for free in
exchange for viewing an advertisement, and the advertiser pays for the
copyrighted'content." 60 Prior to this appeal the Federal Circuit reversed and
remanded the district court's holding of ineligibility regarding the same method
claim, but the Supreme Court vacated that decision and remanded the case back
to the Federal Circuit in light of Mayo.' 61 After CLS Bank, a three-member
panel of the Federal Circuit (which happened to contain both Chief Judge
Rader and Judge Lourie on the remand), unanimously found the method claim
eligible subject matter, 162 but on different grounds. Chief Judge Rader (joined
by Judge O'Malley) authored the majority opinion and again delineated the
Meaningful Limitations Approach.' 63 In concurring, Judge Lourie argued that
Chief Judge Rader's view is contrary to the Supreme Court's precedent in Mayo
and that the Integrated Approach more accurately reflects the Supreme Court's
guidance. 164 Judge Lourie further criticized the majority, arguing that "[w]hile a
computer or complex computer program, as discussed by [Chief Judge Rader],
may be necessary to perform the method, it is not what the claim specifically
requires and thus should not be the focus of the analysis."' 65 However, he
ultimately concurred with the court's finding of eligibility because "[t]he
additional claim limitations reciting how the idea [of 'using advertising as an
exchange or currency'] is implemented 'narrow, confine, or otherwise tie down
the claim so that, in practical terms, it does not cover the full abstract idea
itself.' "166
Both Judge Lourie and Chief Judge Rader predictably re-applied their own
tests in Accenture Global Services v. Guidewire Software, Inc.; however, in this case
they disagreed on the eligibility of system claims directed to a computer
program for handling insurance-related tasks. 167 Judge Reyna joined Judge

160 722 F.3d 1335, 1337 (Fed. Cit. 2013).
161 Id.; see also Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cit. 2011), vacated sub nom.
WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S.Ct. 2431 (2012).
162 Ultramercial,722 F.3d at 1337.
163 Id.at 1343-54.
concurring).
164Id.at 1354-55 (Lourie, J.,
165 Id.at 1355.
166 Id.(quoting CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1282 (Fed. Cit. 2013) (en banc)

concurring); Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC,No. CV 09-06918 RGK (PLAx), 2013
(Lourie, J.,
WL 3360098, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010)).
167 728 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Accenture did not appeal the lower court's determination
at 1337-38.
that the related method claims were also invalid. Id.
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Lourie's majority opinion, which found the system claims ineligible "because
[they] offer no meaningful limitations beyond the method claims that have been
held patent-ineligible and because, when considered on their own, under Mayo
and [the] plurality opinion in CLS Bank, they fail to pass muster.1 68 Judge
Lourie found the system claim similar to the ineligible claims in CLS Bank and
Bancop for their insignificant post-solution activity that merely contained
supplementing software to a computer for a limited field. 169 On the other hand,
the claims were distinguishable from the claims in Ultramerdal,which possessed
specific limits "contain[ing] significantly more than the underlying abstract
concept (e.g., media products, websites, free access), instead of general steps of
performing a task. 70 Additionally: "[b]ecause the system claim[s] and method
claim[s] contain only 'minor differences in terminology [but] require
171
performance of the same basic process,' they should rise or fall together.
Chief Judge Rader dissented, noting that "no part of CLS Bank... carrie[d] the
weight of precedent," so the majority opinion mistakenly "reie[d] significantly
on the [Integrated Approach] proposed by the plurality opinion in CLS Bank"
instead of focusing on precedent from the Federal Circuit or the Supreme
Court, which he believed did not support the majority's proposition. 172 Chief
Judge Rader also challenged Judge Lourie's reliance on a "majority" holding
from CIS Bank for his position that system claims which closely track method
claims and are grounded by the same meaningful limitations "will generally rise
and fall together." He states due to divergent reasoning for the holding in CLS
Bank, in combination with the "claim-by-claim" approach affirmed in
Ulramerial,Judge Lourie's approach "actually follows a procedure rejected
almost unanimously by [the Federal Circuit]."' 73 Instead Chief Judge Rader
would have affirmed the patent-eligibility of the claimed systems because they
"require a specific combination of computer components.' ' 74 Overall, the case
exemplified the court's persisting inability to define an "abstract idea" and
disagreement over the appropriate test for subject matter eligibility.

169

Id. at 1342.
Id.at 1346.

170

Id.

168

171Id.at 1344 (fourth alternative in original) (quoting CLGS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1291).

Id. at 1346-47 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
at 1347 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting id.at 1341 (majority opinion);
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013)) ("[F]ive of the judges who
held that the method claims and system claims rise or fall together stated: [t]o be clear, the fact
that one or more related method claims has failed under § 101, as here, does not dictate that all
associated system claims or even all associated method claims must suffer the same fate."
(quoting CIS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1291 n.4 (Lourie, J., concurring))).
174 Id.
172

173 Id.
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G. REASONS WHY THE SOFTWARE CONTEXT POSES SUCH A PROBLEM

The split between judges in the Federal Circuit persists partly because of the
nature of software patents themselves, as the following scholars explain. One
scholar recognizes that "[s]oftware is intrinsically different from most other
patentable subject matter[] ...[because] [i]t lacks the metaphorical bolt onto
which patent law's primary scope-restricting doctrinal tool can attach toigain
purchase and ratchet in permissible claim scope."'175 Patent doctrine creates
what the author calls "the invenlion-structure equation: it holds as an ontological
matter that an invention 'is' its structure and that an invention's functign is
more peripherally only what an invention 'does.' "176 While this tool is useful
for excluding overbroad claims in other contexts, it fails in the software context
because "software inventions are pure functionality"; they "cannot be defined
with reference to the physical, structural properties of either a tangible copy of
the software on a storage medium or a computer programmed with the
software. They can only be defined by their behavior or function."' 177 Hence,
"[p]erniissible claim scope is usually tethered to the structure of an invention"
(as exemplified by the application of the MOT test), "but purely functional
technologies like software have no relevant structure to which claim scope can
be tethered."'178 The scholar next offers an alternative solution to other tests,
which he describes as "a new software-exceptionalist approach to patent
protection," or a "software-specific 'patch' " in the law, which would "treat
179
algorithms as the metaphorical structure of software inventions."'
Similarly, another scholar offers another possible reason for the ambiguity in
the software patent context. 180 The "cult of the claim" believes that claims
"directly delineate a patent's exclusionary rights," instead of "functioning as
tools" that help to convey the "substantive, technical concept" (the invention)
"disclosed in the application."' 181 The author rebuts patent law's commonly
quoted premise that "[c]laims are the most important part of the modern patent
document." 82 While "claims still play an important part in [his view of the]

Collins, supra note 13, at 1401.
Id. at 1401-02 (quoting In reSwinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
177 Id.at 1402.
175
176

178Id.at 1402-03.
179 Id. at 1404-05. Collins refers to this solution as the invention-algorithm equation. Id.
at 1405.
180 Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REv. 1 (2012).
181 Id.at

5.

Id. at 1 (quoting John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation:
Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 109, 109 (2000)); id.("As stated by Judge Giles
Rich, '[T]he name of the game is the claim.'" (quoting Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and
Interpretalionof Claims-AmericanPerspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.& COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499
182

(1990))).
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patent system,... [they] are written to help delineate the contours of the
technical invention described in the patent."' 1 3 Thus, they "indirectly lead to
the' exclusive rights because they help courts determine what constitutes the
patentable invention." 8 4
"The invention," as best understood, "is the
inventor's own solution to some technical problem for which the inventor seeks
a patent. '"185 The scholar argues for adopting this "substantive, technical vision
of the invention" partly because it "provides a comprehensive way to interpret
the disclosure requirements that can resolve the ongoing debates preventing
consensus.' 18 6 This "substantive vision gives claims critically important
contextual meaning by tying the purpose of the claims to the overall purpose of
the specification."' 8 7 "[To determine if the patent application contains a
'patentable invention,'" he proposes "two distinct determinations."' 88 First,
one must "determin[e] what was invented.' 18 9 This step involves looking at
both § 101 and 5 112. Second, one must "determin[e] if (or what portion of)
the invention is patentable."19 0 This step involves using both § 102 and
103.191 While the "cult allows claims that extend well beyond the subject
matter disclosed or even contemplated by the inventor[,] ... the substantive
view inherently limits patent claims to subject matter that was conceived and
disclosed by the inventor."' 192 Additionally, the scholar notes that "[Chief]
Judge Rader and Judge Linn are likely the strongest and most vocal current
193
supporters for the cult of the claim."'
Another scholar further suggests that because software patents are often
cloaked in overbroad claim language describing "the software only in... general
terms of functionality," they become vulnerable to patent trolls. 194 Moreover, the
USPTO does not "provide[] any effective cataloging of software patent
claims[,] ... [so] it is impossible for software firms to do effective freedom-to-

183 Id. at 5.
184 Id.
185

Id.

186 Id.
187 Id. at
188 Id. at
189 Id. at
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id at
193 Id. at

6.
16 (quoting 35 U.S.C.
23.

271 (2006)).

26.
36.

194 See Burns, supra note 7, at 65-66 ("Software patents can have unpredictable claim
interpretation, unclear scope, and questionable validity, in part because the patents rarely include
actual code, often describing the software only in broad and general terms of functionality. As a
result, the blurred boundaries of these patents provide greater opportunity to extract rents from
software companies.").
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Therefore,
operate searches to void [sic] infringing software patents."195
infringement of software claims appears unavoidable, and there have even been
complaints "about the 'culture of intentionally infringing patents' in the software
industry."'196 Accordingly, "[p]atent lawsuits involving [patent trolls] have
increased dramatically over the last decade," and "[s]oftware patents may account
for over ninety percent of troll's [sic] most-litigated patents." 197 Another
commentator additional reported that this patent troll problem due to overlbioad
software claims cost named defendants in frivolous, troll-related lawsuits "over
$29 billion" in out-of-pocket expenses. 198 Overall, these scholars describe how
-the patent troll problem is damaging the software and technology sector.

III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE INTEGRATED APPROACH
To resolve the unique problems posed by the software context identified in
Part II, the Supreme Court should adopt Judge Lourie's Integrated Approach
for three reasons. First, it is the most consistent with the Supreme Court's
analysis in Mayo. Second, it dictates results consistent with previous Federal
Circuit cases involving software patents, thus readily resolving the perceived
ambiguity with uniform reasoning. Finally, its strong view applies strict scrutiny
to software patent eligibility through a substantive vision of the invention, which
will effectuate the goals of patent law and mitigate the patent troll problem.
A. THE INTEGRATED APPROACH IS MOST CONSISTENT WITH MAYO

Judge Lourie's Integrated Approach closely mirrors several key aspects of
Justice Breyer's analysis in Mayo: the analytical framework and terminology,
understanding of inventive concept, and requirement that claims "rise and fall
together." In Mayo, Justice Breyer first mentions the statutory categories in
5 101 and the three judicial exceptions, paralleling Judge Lourie's first and
second steps. 199 Regarding the abstractness exception in Step 2, the Integrated

195Id.at 56 (citing Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289, 301-05 (2012)).
196 Id. (quoting Michael Orey & Moira Herbst, Inside Nathan Myhrvold's Mysterious New Idea
Machine, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK MAGAZINE (uly 2, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/
stories/2006-07-02/inside-nathan-myhrvolds-mysterious-new-idea-machine).
197Id. at 65 ("Mhe number of PAE-instigated patent lawsuits in the United States [is]
increasing by an estimated average of more than thirty-three percent peryear since 2004.").
198 Bessen, supra note 11.
199 Compare Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)
(quoting the categories of patent-eligible subject matter in § 101 and continuing with an
explanatory of each judicial exception), with CLS Bank, 717 F.3d 1269, 1282 (Laurie, J.,
concurring) (first, one must ask "whether the claimed invention fits when one of the four
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Approach asks whether the claim poses any risk of preempting an abstract
idea. 200 To answer this question, Steps 2(a) and 2(b) Judge Lourie draw
language directly from Mayo.201 Step 2(a) asks one to "identify and define
whatever fundamental concept appears wrapped up in the claim" and Step 2(b)
asks if there are any "additional substantive limitations that narrow, confine, or
otherwise tie down the claim so that practical terms, it does not cover the full
abstract idea itself."
The "substantive limitations" in Step 2(b) requires
precisely what Justice Breyer demands-the claims must "add enough to their
statements" to ensure that they "do significantly more than simply describe"
natural laws or abstract ideas. 202 Furthermore, Judge Lourie notes that his
"requirement for substantive claim limitations" has sometimes been referred to as
an "inventive concept," or a "genuine human contribution to the claimed
subject matter," 20 3 drawing from Justice Breyer's recitation of Flook and
Bilski.2o4
Chief Judge Rader criticized Judge Lourie's interpretation of "inventive
concept" as violative of Diehr (as reaffirmed in Mayo) because it results in
"stripping away all known elements from the asserted system claims and
analyzing only whether what remains, as opposed to the claim as a whole, is an
abstract idea. '205 Other commentators have also suggested that Judge Lourie's

statutory classes set out in § 101." Second, "[a]ssuming [the first] condition is met, the analysis
turns to the judicial exceptions to subject-matter eligibility.").
200 CLS Bank, 717 F.3d 1269, 1282; supra text accompanying note 138.
201 Compare CLS Bank, 717 F.3d 1269, 1282, with Mayo, 717 F.3d at 1302 ("[T]he steps add
nothing of significance to the natural laws themselves.... [T]he patent claims do not confine their
reach to particular applications of those laws.... [T]hese patents fie up too much future use of
laws of nature." (emphasis added)).
202 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297; see also CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1982
("[Requiring] additional substantive limitations .
(citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1300)); supra text
accompanying note 127.
203 717 F.3d at 1282.
204 See supra note 107 and accompanying text (Justice Breyer characterized the "inventive
concept" as an important principle in Mayo); seealso Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (precedent "insist[s]
that a process that focuses upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements or a
combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an 'incentive concept,' sufficient to ensure
that the 'patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law
itself ").

205 CTS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1315 (Moore, J., dissenting in part and joined by Chief Judge Rader);
seealso id.at 1335 (Rader, C.J., additional reflections) ("[T]o inject the patentability test of
'inventiveness' into the separate statutory concept of subject matter eligibility makes this doctrine
again 'the plaything of the judges who, as they became initiated into its mysteries, delighted to
devise and expound their own ideas of what it meant.'" (quoting Giles S. Rich, Priniples of
Patentabiliy, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 393, 404 (1960))); see also supra note 157 and accompanying
text (highlighting Chief Judge Rader's similar argument made against Judge Laurie in reference to
the views of the other Federal Judges).
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approach is inconsistent with the Court's precedent in Mqyo, Bi/ski, and Diehr,206
however, these criticisms are overstated for several reasons. 2 7 First, Judge Lourie
cites Mayo for the proposition that the claim must be evaluated "as a whole"
when "look[ing] for meaningful limitations" 208-i.e.,
"substanive kmitaions that
narrow, confine, or otherwise tie down the claim. 209 Second, Judge Lourie
explains his conception of "inventive concept" as referring to "a genuine human
contribution to the claimed subject matter" with several citations to Mayo.210 Third,
the practical effect of the Integrated Approach is to "consider[,] whether steps
combined with a natural law or abstract idea are so insignificant, conventional, or
routine as to yield a claim that effectively covers the natural law or abstract idea
itself."211 Overall, Judge Lourie's Integrated Approach tracks Justice Breyer's
conception of inventiveness in Mayo and explicitly cites precedent for its
characterization of the correct subject matter eligibility analysis.
I
Moreover, it is Chief Judge Rader's Meaningful Limitations Approach that is
actually inconsistent with the Supreme Court's prior precedent. 212 Chief Judge
Rader argues that inventiveness should be governed by § 103,213 and that Mayo's
use of "inventive concept" "should [not] be read to instill an 'inventiveness' or
'ingenuity' component into the [§ 101] inquiry. ' 214 Instead, he argues that
"inventive concept" should be read as an "inquiry into whether implementing
the abstract idea in the context of the claimed invention inherently requires the
recited steps." 215 Continuing, he states "if, to implement the abstract concept,
one must perform the additional step, then the step merely separately restates an
element of the abstract idea, and thus does not further limit the abstract
concept to a practical application." 216 This interpretation of "inventive
concept" appears in practice to require a structural component, and transforms
an ineligible method claim into an eligible system claim merely because it
satisfies the MOT test.217 As Moore's opinion (joined by C.J. Rader) states,
Alice's Petition for Certiorari, supra note 47, at 25-28.
See Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-219, 2013 WL 4427811, at *5-6 n.4
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013).
208 CLS Bank, 717 F.3d 1269, 1281 (Lourie, J., concurring) (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302).
209Id. at 1282 (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1300).
210 Id. at 1283; PlanetBingo, 2013 WL 4427811, at *5.
211 CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1284; PlanetBingo, 2013 WL 4427811, at *5.
212 PlanetBingo, 2013 WL 4427811, at *5.
213 CLS Bank, 717 F.3d 1269, 1295-96 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("One final point confirming the breadth of Section 101 is the 1952 Act's deliberate decision to
place the substantive requirement for 'invention' in Section 103.'.
206
207

214
215
216

Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1303.
Id.

217 Id. at 1305 ("If tying a method to a machine can be an important indication of patenteligibility, it would seem that a claim embodying the machine itseff, with all its structural and
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[A] system claim's structural limitations restrict the claimed
machine by requiring certain physical components.
These
concrete elements are precisely the sort of 'inventive concept'
that meaningfully limits the claim, preventing it from 'tying up'
the underlying abstract idea itself. Although the individual
components themselves may not be new or innovative, the
particular combination of components recited in the claim results in
218
a brand new machine-a special purpose computer.

However, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized in Bilski and Mayo that
while it is "an important and useful clue," the MOT test "is not a definitive test
219
of patent eligibility."
Additionally, the Integrated Approach is more consistent with Mayo than the
Meaningful Limitations Approach since the former requires that the claims "rise
and fall together." Although Justice Breyer did not explicitly decree that exact
phrase in Mayo, he hinted at the idea by warning that the Court should not
"make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the draftsman's art' without
reference to the 'principles underlying the prohibition against patents for
[natural laws].' "220 This requirement also stems from earlier cases such as
Cybersource221 and Bancotp.222 Therefore, the Supreme Court supports the
conclusion that the form of the claim-either method, medium, or systemshould not alter the determination of subject matter eligibility when in reality,
they all preempt the same abstract idea. Finally, eight of the ten judges in CLS
Bank believed that the claims should rise or fall together, leaving only Chief
Judge Rader and Judge O'Malley in disagreement. This overwhelming majority
champions adopting the test that embraces substantive claim congruity, despite
arbitrary differences in form based on the patentee's clever draftsmanship. To
do otherwise would only further confuse the standard for subject matter

functional limitations, would rarely, if ever, be an abstract idea."); see also Planet Bingo, 2013 WL
4427811, at *5 (making a similar argument).
dissenting in part).
218 CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1316 (Moore, J.,
219 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2012); Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) ("The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test
for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible 'process.' "); see also Planet Bingo, 2013 WL
4427811, at *5.
220Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (alteration in original) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593
(1978)).
221 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (concluding that the Beauregard claim was
ineligible based on the corresponding, and ineligible, method claim).
222 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (treating system and medium claims the same
as the ineligible method claim).
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eligibility and distract from the accurate focus on the invention claimed in the
patent document.
Overall, the Integrated Approach should be adopted because it is more
consistent with Mayo than the Meaningful Limitations Approach for its
analytical framework and terminology, interpretation of inventive concept, and
requirement that claims should rise and fall together.
B. THE INTEGRATED APPROACH RECONCILES PRECEDENT AND CURES
AMBIGUITY

The Integrated Approach should also be adopted because it produces
outcomes consistent with the Federal Circuit's recent software-patent decisions
rendering the confusion and ambiguity moot by harmonizing its reasoning.
When applied to cases adjudicating the eligibility of claims within registered
patents, Step one-identifying whether the claimed invention fits within one of
the four statutory classes set out in 5 101-is necessarily always met. The
answer to Step Two-assessing whether one of the three exceptions applies to
the subject matter-is almost invariably abstractness in the software context,
and is the only exception under scrutiny in each of the subsequent cases
discussed. Accordingly, when applying the Integrated Approach in CLS Bank,
to determine if the claim preempts an abstract idea, Step 2(a) identifies "the
abstract idea [as] reducing settlement risk by effecting trades through a thirdparty intermediary ...empowered to verify that both parties can fulfill their
obligations before allowing the exchange-i.e., a form of escrow." 223 Regarding
Step 2(b), Judge Lourie noted that "[n]one of [the] limitations adds anything of
substance to the claim" because "[t]here is no specific or limiting recitation of
essential, or improved computer technology, and no reason to view the
computer limitation as anything but 'insignificant postsolution activity' relative
to the abstract idea. '224 Instead, the method claim used "extravagant language
to recite a basic function" and "add[ed] nothing of pracical significance to the
underlying idea." 225 Similarly, in evaluating the computer-readable medium
claim, Judge Lourie explained that although it "appears to invoke a physical
object,.., every substantive limitation presented in the body of the
claim... pertains to the method steps of the program code 'embodied in the
medium.'"226 Thus, "for 5 101 purposes," the computer-readable medium
claims were practically "equivalent to the methods they recite[d]" because "the
guise of a device... do[es] not overcome the Supreme Court's warning to
223 CSI_Bank, 717 F.3d 1269, 1286.
224Id.

225 Id.
at 1287 (emphasis added).
226 Id.at 1288.
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avoid permitting a 'competent draftsman' to endow abstract claims with patenteligible status." 227 Moreover, the system claims were "akin to stating the
abstract idea of third-party intermediation and adding the words: 'apply it' on a
computer"; 228 hence, the method, medium, and corresponding system claims all
fell together.
The Integrated Approach also proved useful in both Ultramerdal and
Accenture. As discussed, the claim in Ultramericalinvolved eleven total steps for
"distributing copyrighted products (e.g., songs, movies, books) over the Internet
where the consumer receives a copyrighted product for free in exchange for
viewing an advertisement, and the advertiser pays for the copyrighted
content." 229 In Judge Lourie's concurring opinion, he utilized Step 2(a) of the
Integrated Approach to define the claim's abstract idea as "us [ing] advertising as
an exchange or currency. '230 Contrasting the claims to those in CLS Bank,
Judge Lourie argued Ultramercial's claims constituted eligible subject matter
because "the added limitations in these claims represent significantly more than
the underlying abstract idea of using advertising as an exchange or currency and,
as a consequence, do not preempt the use of that idea in all fields." 231 In other
words, when applying Step 2(b), the additional limitations "narrow[ed],
232
confine[d], or otherwise tie[d] down the claim.
In Judge Lourie's majority opinion in Accenture, he applied the Integrated
Approach to find "a system for generating tasks to be performed in an
insurance organization" ineligible subject matter.233 Judge Lourie concluded
that because the corresponding method claims were held ineligible, the system
claims should fall accordingly; however, he noted that they "failed to pass
muster. '234 To determine whether the system claims risked preempting an
abstract idea, Judge Lourie identified the abstract idea (Step 2(a)) as "generating
tasks [based on] rules... to be completed upon the occurrence of an

227 Id.
228 Id. at 1291 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012))229 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2013); supra notes 14650 and accompanying text.
230 Ultramerdal, Inc., 722 F.3d 1355 (Laurie, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting
Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, No. CV 09-06918 RGK (PLAx), 2010 WL 3360098, at *6 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 13, 2010), rev'd sub nom. Ultramerial,722 F.3d 1335).
231 Id.
232 Id. (quoting CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1282 (Fed. Cit. 2013) (Lourie, J.,

concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
233 Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1337-38 (Fed.
Cir. 2013); supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
234 Accenture GlobalServs., 728 F.3d at 1342.
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event." 235 In applying Step 2(b), Judge Lourie said, the limitations "do not
'narrow, confine, or otherwise tie down the claim'... [because] simply
implementing an abstract concept on a computer, without meaningful
limitations to that concept, does not transform a patent-ineligible claim into a
patent-eligible one."236 Judge Lourie added, when looking at the claim, "the
complexity of the implementing software or the level of detail in the
specification does not transform a claim reciting only an abstract concept into a
patent-eligible system or method." 237 In other words, there was no inventive
concept or practical application, beyond the insubstantial limitation to a generalpurpose computer, to prevent the claims from effectively preempting an
abstract idea itself.
Applying the Integrated Approach to the facts in C berSource, Dealerirack,and
Banco p would also result in the same outcome as the one reached by the panel
of judges in each of these cases. This consistency demonstrates the Federal
Circuit's incoherent reasoning can be easily reconciled, without constituting a
dramatic shift in the law if the Supreme Court were to formally adopt the
Integrated Approach.
The claim in Cybergource "recite[d] a " 'method and system for detecting
fraud in a credit card transaction between [a] consumer and a merchant over the
Internet,"' which Judges Dyk, Bryson, and Prost found to be ineligible subject
matter for reciting "an unpatentable mental process. ' 238 Under the Integrated
Approach, the claims would also be found ineligible for preempting an abstract
idea. Applying Step 2(a), the abstract idea of each claim would be characterized
as "any method or system for detecting credit card fraud which utilizes
information relating credit card transactions to particular 'Internet
address[es].' "239 Applying Step 2(b), there would be no substantial limitations
to narrow, confine, or otherwise tie down the idea because the claimed
"imitations" solely constitute mental processes. 24° Basically, the claim method
involves merely collecting data from the Internet, making a list, and then using
logical reasoning to detect fraud, none of which is inventive or a product of

235 Id. at 1344 (alterations in original) (quoting Component Based Interface to Handle Tasks
During Claim Processing, U.S. Patent No. 7,013,284, Cal. 107 UI.
25, 38-31 (filed May 4, 1999)

(issued Mar. 4, 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
236Id. at 1345.

Id.
238Cyber Source Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1367-71 (second alteration in
original) (quoting Method & Sys. for Detecting Fraud in Credit Card Transaction over the
Internet, U.S. Patent No. 6,029, 154, at [57] (filed July 28,1997) (issued Feb. 22, 2000)).
239Id at 1368 (alteration in original) (quoting '154 Patent, Reexaminafion Cerificate, col2 11. 38-47).
240See id at 1371 ("[T]he '154 Patent fails to recite patent-eligible subject matter because it is
drawn to an unpatentable mental process-a subcategory of unpatentable abstract ideas.").
237
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human ingenuity. 241 Thus, although ihe judges in CyberSource did not explicitly
apply the Integrated Approach, their analysis in effect included the same steps
and-produced a consistent result.
Similarly,- in Dealertrack,Judges Linn, Plager, and Dyk found the "computeraided method and system [claims] ...for processing credit applications over
electronic networks" ineligible subject matter.242 Applying Step 2(a) of the
Integrated Approach, the abstract idea embedded in the claim is "sending
information back and forth, at specified time intervals or in sequence, from a
dealer to a lender or from a lender to another lender." 243 These claims would
not pass ,Step 2(b) because the limiting steps did not contain an inventive
concept or meaningful limitations on the claim's scope.244 More specifically, as
the .cpurt noted, "the claims here recite only that the method is .'computeradded' without specifying any level of involvement or detail. The, fact that
certain algorithms are disclosed in,the specification does not change the
outcome."'245 Therefore, the claim preempts an abstract idea under the
Integraited Approach, dictating a result consistent with the court's actual
outcome.
Finally, in Bancorp, the Integrated Approach would also produce the same
result reached by the Federal Circuit panel, which included Judge Lourie, along
with Judges Prost and Wallach. 246 Although Judge Lourie did not explicitly
employ the Integrated Approach in the case, his analytical framework was
essentialy equivalent. The method, medium, and system claims reciting a
process "for administering and tracking the value of life insurance policies in
separate accounts" fell together for preempting an abstract idea. 247 Judge
Lourie identified the abstract idea (Step 2(a)) as "[managing a stable value
protected life insurance policy] and then instruct[ing] the use of well-known
[calculations] to help establish some of the inputs into the equation. '248 Under
Step 2(b), there are no substantial limitations, because the computer is only used
for its basic function of computations, and therefore does not tie the abstract

241

See id.at 1372 ("All of claim 3's method steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a

human using a pen and paper.").
242 Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1317, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
243 Id. at 1332 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brief of Defendants-Appellees David
L. Huber & Finance Express, LLC at 28, Deakrtrack, 674 F.3d 1315 (Nos. 2009-1566, 2009-1588),
2010 WL 5306897, at *28).
244 Id. at 1333 ("The claims here do not require a specific application, nor are they tied to a
particular machine.").
245 Id. at 1333-34.
246 Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
247 Id. at 1269, 1277-78.
248 Id. at 1278 (first and third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010)).
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idea to a specific inventive concept. 249 The "mathematical algorithm... is
assumed to be within the prior art, [and thus] the application, considered as a
'250
whole, contains no patentable invention.
Altogether, applying the Integrated Approach to past cases involving patent
eligibility of software or computer-related inventions garners results consistent
with the understanding of the majority of the Federal Circuit judges and would
reconcile the past outcomes with uniform reasoning. Therefore, the Supreme
Court should adopt this approach to resolve the perceived ambiguity and grant
necessary relief for uncertain patentees, the USPTO, and lower courts.
C. THE INTEGRATED APPROACH BEST EFFECTUATES THE POLICY BEHIND
PATENT LAW

A final reason why the Supreme Court should adopt the Integrated
Approach is because it best serves the underlying policy goals of patent law, as
expressed recently in Mayo, and would help resolve the current patent troll
problem.
To reiterate, 35 U.S.C. 5 101 declares subject matter eligible for patentability
if it is "new and useful."251 Thus, the statutory language itself requires
innovaiveness or inventiveness, in light of its constitutional purpose-"[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts. '252 The three judicial exceptions to
5 101 were recognized by the Court because "monopolization of those [basic]
tools [of scientific and technological work] through the grant of a patent might
tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it."253 Justice
Breyer encompassed this notion in Mayo by excluding "well-understood,
routine, conventional activity, previously engaged in by those in the field. '254
Judge Lourie incorporates these tenants into the Integrated Approach to
invalidate claims. 255 Although the language employed through the steps of both
the Integrated Approach and Meaningful Limitations Approach otherwise

249 Id. at 1280 ("[W]ithout the computer limitations nothing remains in the claims but the
abstract idea of managing a stable value protected life insurance policy by performing calculations
and manipulating the results.").
250 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978)).
251 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
252 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
253 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
254 Id. at 1299.

255See CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J.,
concurring) ("Limitations that represent a human contribution but are merely tangential, routine,
well-understood, or conventional, or in practice fail to narrow the claim relative to the
fundamental principle therein, cannot confer patent eligibility.").
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appear similar,25 6 these tenants are what effectively distinguish the CLS Bank

tests and render the Integrated Approach the more efficient, reliable, and
practically useful test for the software context.
Chief Judge Rader's Meaningful Limitations Approach embodies the
"invention-structure equation," and is therefore an incorrect description of the
law, regardless of its inconsistency with Mayo, because the use of a particular
machine is not required to avoid preempting an abstract idea.25 7 For example,
in Ultramerial,Chief Judge Rader found the method claim eligible because the
steps involved programming that created an "extensive computer interface."
This programming, he argued, generated a new machine. 258 However, Judge
Lourie's Integrated Approach also found Ultramercias method claim eligible,
but without the requirement of a machine or structural components. 259 Instead,
he identified "[t]he additional claim limitations reciting how th[e] idea [was]
implemented [to] 'narrow, confine, and otherwise tie down the claim.' ",260 In
other words, he focused on the important contextual meaning of the claim,
looking at how the specific limitations effectuated the specification's functional
purpose as a whole. Judge Lourie noted, "[w]hile a computer or complex
computer program, as discussed by [Chief Judge Rader], may be necessary to
perform the method, it is not what the claim specifically requires and thus
'261
should not be the focus of the analysis.

256 Compare supra text accompanying note 139, with supra text accompanying notes 147-48 (Judge
Lourie's step 2(a) and (b) involve identifying the fundamental concept and any substantial
limitations. Chief Judge Rader's two steps involve identifying the abstract concept and any
meaningful limitations.).
257 See supra text accompanying notes 83-84, 176 (Bi1sk" clarified that the MOT is not the
exclusive test. The MOT fails in the software catalyst due to his pure functionality.); see also
Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Wildtangent, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012). In Ultramerdal,Chief Judge Rader
found the method claim eligible because one of the steps required complex computer
programing, which he argued created a new machine. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d
1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013). However, Judge Lourie found the same claim eligible for a different reason
that did not require the use of a machine. Id. at 1354-55 (Lourie,J., concurring).
258 Ultramerrial,722 F.3d at 1398 (majority opinion) ("[P]rogramming creates a new machine,
because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is
programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software."
(quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994)), abrogatedby In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943
(Fed. Cir. 2008)).
259 Id. at 1354-55 (Lourie, J., concurring).
260 Id. at 1355 (quoting CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(Lourie, J., concurring)).
261 Id.
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Judge Lourie correctly criticizes Chief Judge Rader's analysis because "it
262
makes no sense" to discuss software inventions in terms of their struct-ure.
Software patents have a purely functional purpose, without requiring "the
specification of any physical, structural propert[y ... [to] identif[y] what a
software inventor has invented." 263 Rather, in the software context, "[t]he
invention is the inventor's own specific way of solving some relevant
problem. ' '264 Therefore, a software invention is not necessarily "tethered- to a
particular machine or physical components, which Chief Judge Rader would
require.265 Overall, Chief Judge Rader's conception of inventiveness is not only
inconsistent with Mayo's incorporation of the requirement in the 1 101 inquiry,
but also with the nature of the software context itself.
On the other hand, the Integrated Approach's strong view embodies a
substantive understanding of the term invention,266 which is also consistent-with
Mayo. If explicitly adopted by the Supreme Court, it would improve the
"completeness, accuracy, and precision" of the patent system. 2.67 This
substantive view of the invention would denounce the cult of the "laim, of
which Chief Judge Rader is a "vocal current supporter," 268 and once again "put
the invention at the center of patent law," while appreciating claims as an
"administrative tool for securing exclusive rights in the invention.'?? 69 This
focus on functionality of the invention and the Integrated Approach, combined,
would limit, eligible patent claims to the "substantive invention created by the
inventor. '270 Although patent law places great emphasis on'the importance of
patent claims, "the subject matter invented by the inventor exists before a patent
is filed and before any claims have been written., The thing invented by
inventors is their solution to same problem; it is the inventors means to same
useful end."'271 The invention should be thought of as a "substantive, technical

See Collins, supra note 13, at 1402 ("Software inventions ... cannot be defined with reference
to the physical, structural properties of either a tangible copy of the software on a storage
medium or a computer programmed with the software, they can only be defined by their behavior
262

function.").
263
264

Id.

265

Collins, supra note 13, at 1402-03; see also, e.g., Ultramerial,722 F.3d 1335, 1352-53 (Chief

Iivak, supranote 180, at 20.

Judge Rader focuses on the invention's extensive computer interface" and programmingphysical aspects of the invention which create a "new machine").
266 Liivak, smpra note 180, at 20 ("The invention is the inventor's own specific way of solving

some relevant problem.').
267

Id.at 54.

268

Id. at 36.

269

Id.at 54.

270

Id.

271

Id. at 1.
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concept," 272 and a § 101 analysis determines what this is. This interpretation
ties the purpose of the claim to the overall purpose of the specification, giving it
important contextual meaning. If the Supreme Court definitively adopts a
"substantive, technical vision of the invention, 273 as implemented in the
Integrated Approach, it will use § 101 and the judicially created exceptions to
rule, out overbroad claims that fail to "promote the Progress of Science and
274
useful Arts."
This focus on the invention in turn will allow the Court to aid in resolving the
current patent troll problem, largely attributable to software patents.2 75 The
approach will force the USPTO to deny patent applications for overbroad
software claims, decreasing the number of software patents potentially
vulnerable to trolls, and mitigating the costs associated with frivolous
litigation. 276 As mentioned, Justice Breyer hints at the lurking patent troll
problem in Mayo: "[t]he exclusion from patent law of basic truths reflects
'both... the enormous potential for rent seeking that would be created if
properlty rights could be obtained in them and ... the enormous transaction
costs that would be imposed on would-be users [of those truths].' "277 While
Justice Breyer notes that the law should attempt to balance competing
considerations of different fields, the Court seeks to limit the "very exclusivity
that
impede[s] the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur,
invention, by, for example, raising the price of using the patented
ideas once created, requiring potential users to conduct costly and
time-consuming searches of existing patents and pending patent
applications, and requiring the negotiation of complex licensing
278
arrangements.
The patent troll problem in the software context is increasing these transaction
costs and litigation expenses referenced by the Supreme Court. Breyer's
language suggests that the Supreme Court in Mayo is concerned with this stark
persistence of the patent troll problem, extensively rampant in the software
272 Id. at 5.
273 Id. at 16.
274 U.S. CONST. art. 1,

§ 8, cl. 8.
See Burns, supra note 7, at 65 ("Software patents may account for over ninety percent of
troll's [sic] most-litigated patents.").
276 See supra notes 7, 11 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying notes 194-98.
277 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 (2012) (quoting
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 305-06 (2003)).
278 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305.
275

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2014

35

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 5

J. INIELL PROP.L[

[Vol. 21:341

context; therefore, the Supreme Court should adopt the stronger view
presented in the Integrated Approach to mitigate the trolls from extensively
279
"wreaking damage" in the technology sector.
Overall, the Integrated Approach, focusing on the invention rather than claim
language, looks for a technical solution to an existing practical problem. By doing
so, it forces patentees to forthrightly demonstrate their invention's genuine
human contribution, making it easier for the USPTO to identify the invention
and therefore to determine eligibility. The approach will also incentivize
innovation by ruling out claims that monopolize abstract ideas; however, it will do
so without excluding claims that lack structural limitations, which Chief Judge
Rader's approach would require despite its incongruity in the software context
and inconsistency with Mayo. Instead, Judge Lourie's strong view, by excluding
overbroad claims that only limited abstract ideas through "well-understod,
280
routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field,"
will best serve the goals of patent law and the technology sector while mitigating
the patent troll problem. Altogether, the Integrated Approach should be adopted
because it provides precisely "[w]hat is needed[:] a consistent, cohesive, and
accessible approach to the 5 101 analysis-a framework that will provide
guidance and predictability for patent applicants and examiners, litigants, and the
courts."

281

IV. CONCLUSION

The Federal Circuit is fractured over a proper standard to govern the subject
matter eligibility determination of software patents. Although the problem may
be attributable to the inherently functional nature of software, rather than the
Federal Circuit's ineptitude, the inconsistent reasoning has created ambiguity in
the law. This confusion has sparked problems for patentees who fear for
validity attacks on their patents, the USPTO who must process thousands of
software patent applications each year, and lower courts that must deal with the
extensive litigation over the validity of many software patent claims. The
unclear ineligibility standard also contributes to the patent troll problem that is
wreaking havoc in the software and technology sector. Thankfully, the
Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari for CLS Bank, presenting an
opportunity to clarify the patent eligibility guidelines in the software context.
The Court should adopt the Integrated Approach, as opposed to Chief
Judge Rader's Meaningful Limitations Approach or another test, for three
279 Burns, supra note 7.

280 CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294).
281 Id.at 1277.
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reasons. First, the Integrated Approach is the most consistent with Mayo for its
closely tracked language, interpretation of inventive concept, and requirement
that claims should rise and fall together. Second, an application of the
Integrated Approach to facts of prior Federal Circuit precedent reveals that the
perceived ambiguity can easily be reconciled with uniform reasoning that would
not dramatically change the law, and would reflect the understanding of a
majority of the Federal Circuit judges. Finally, the Supreme Court should adopt
the Integrated Approach because it is consistent with the Supreme Court's
policy considerations, and because it takes a strong view that would invalidate
more claims that risk preempting an abstract idea, thereby mitigating the patent
troll problem that persists in the software context.
Until the Supreme Court resolves this confusion in the law, dire problems
will persist among anxious patentees, the overwhelmed USPTO, and
overburdened courts. Onlookers can now only hope that the Justices of the
Supreme Court can work more cohesively than the judges on the Federal
Circuit to apply a wise resolution and bring much needed clarity to the software
patent context.
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